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BOOK REVIEWS

the Voice of America over missions,
“firewalls,” journalism norms, and
organizational independence.
Yet the book has limitations. He problematically conflates the generic and
constituent elements of public diplomacy––listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and
international broadcasting––in the
book’s framework of underlying
themes. He gives (as he recognizes) disproportionate attention to Washington,
USIA’s directors, and broadcast media.
The author ends with a brief look at lessons for the future, such as the need to
include public diplomacy in foreignpolicy planning and for the United
States to listen as well as speak. These
are valuable insights. But new forces are
shaping twenty-first-century diplomacy. Networks challenge hierarchies.
Attention––not information––is the
scarce resource. Globalism, nonstate actors, a mix of secular and religious “big
ideas,” digital technologies, and new
media are transforming the old order.
Cull is sensitive to these forces and to
the ways in which they are changing diplomacy. Perhaps one day he will write
another book that completes his history
of USIA and explores the evolution of
public diplomacy in a world that is
vastly different from the Cold War. In
the meantime, Cull’s masterful history
will be the gold standard in scholarship
on USIA.
BRUCE GREGORY

George Washington University
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Michigan State University professor
Kristie Macrakis provides an interesting, if somewhat disjointed, look into
one part of the former East German
Ministry for State Security, the department commonly known as the “Stasi.”
In its time, the Stasi was one of the
most effective intelligence and security
organizations on the planet. The book
under review provides a look into a key
aspect of Stasi operations. Its author,
Kristie Macrakis, has written several
books on modern Germany and conveys a deep understanding of German
thought and attitudes, but her lack of
knowledge on intelligence matters unfortunately limits her understanding of
her chosen topic. However, the professional who is willing to dig past the
discrepancies will find value.
The book is divided into two parts,
“High-Tech” and “Spy-Tech.” The latter section focuses on “spy technology”
and will fascinate the dilettante and inform the professional. It is in this section that Macrakis appears more
comfortable and writes with greater
confidence and insight. If your favorite
James Bond character is Q, you will
love this section. Secret writing, spy
cameras, and other surveillance gadgets
abound.
Unfortunately, the first section is not as
well written as the second. It provides
valuable information for intelligence
and policy professionals, focusing on
the Stasi’s quest to steal high-technology
information and hardware from the
West, primarily West Germany.
Macrakis describes economic espionage
as a major role for the Stasi’s foreignintelligence arm, backed by an extensive
organization within the ministry and
throughout the East German state.
However, an inadequate understanding
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of intelligence prevents her from presenting real insights, which readers
must find for themselves. Still, the
depth of the author’s research and her
superior understanding of the German
psyche are definite enablers for an astute reader.
On the basis of extensive archival research as well as interviews with former
officers, the author describes how the
Stasi succeeded in stealing technical
plans, equipment, and software. Attempting to gain an economic edge on
the West, East Germans spent thousands of marks to steal millions of
marks’ worth of technology. Macrakis
also describes the ultimate futility of
this effort: East Germany could not incorporate the technology faster than the
West could innovate and thus lagged
farther and farther behind. Stealing
technology is relatively simple, but incorporating that technology and making it an effective part of a national
economy is not.
Another major challenge for the Stasi
was Western technology-control regimes. While imperfect and implemented long after the Stasi had begun
its operations, these regimes significantly increased the effort required.
Eventually, the cost of stealing and the
inability of East Germany to integrate
what it took doomed the Stasi’s efforts
to failure.
Contemporary critics of current
technology-control regimes should note
that many nations have learned from
the Stasi’s mistakes and now make the
transfer of “know-how” a key element
of their technological-industrialeconomic espionage programs. Those
charged with enforcing technologytransfer laws can also learn lessons from
this work.
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In March 1921, the U.S. subchaser SC154 fired on a cable ship attempting to
land a transoceanic cable near Miami,
Florida. The cable to South America
would have been operated under foreign control. While the ship was undamaged, the cable never reached land.
The lessons of World War I had left the
United States willing to use force rather
than allow a new foreign-controlled
communications link to North America. In his excellent study, Jonathan
Winkler recalls these episodes, describing the international and naval communications structures of the era, their
influence on the war, and America’s
recognition of its dependence on foreign communications systems. The
Navy, with a cadre of technical experts
and the need to command and control
a worldwide fleet, played a central role
in shaping a U.S. communications
policy intended to reduce these
vulnerabilities.
The years before World War I represent
the start of our networked world.
Trade, overseas news, colonial administration and the coordination of far-flung
military forces all became dependent on
a web of undersea communications cables, supplemented by a limited number
of long-range radio stations. Understanding this dependence, both Great
Britain and Germany entered the war
with contingency plans to cut enemy
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